- Fair Allocation of Improvements: When Old Endowments Shape New Assignments
N. Klein-Elmalem; R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- Weighted Envy Freeness with Bounded Subsidies
N. Klein-Elmalem; R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- Deep Reinforcement Learning and Influenced Games
C. Brady; R. Gonen; G. Rabinovich
- Heuristics for Opinion Diffusion via Local Elections
R. Gonen; M. Koutecky; R. Menasheof; N. Talmon
- Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-Sided Markets
D. Gilor; R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Social Graphs
P. Faliszewski; R. Gonen; M. Koutecky; N. Talmon
- A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism
R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data
I. Shtechman; R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets
D. Gilor; R. Gonen; E. Segal-Halevi
- COMBIMA: Truthful, Budget Maintaining, Dynamic Combinatorial Market
R. Gonen; O. Egri
- Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space
R. Gonen; A. Lerner
- Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations
M. Feldman; G. Frim; R. Gonen
- Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants
M. Feldman; R. Gonen
- DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced Double-sided Combinatorial Market
R. Gonen; O. Egri
- Databroker System: A New Online Advertising System That Keeps Users Engaged While Preserving Their Privacy
R. Gonen
- Characterizing Incentive Compatible, Pareto Optimal and Sufficiently Anonymous Constrained Combinatorial Mechanisms - Two Players Case
R. Gonen; A. Lerner
- Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
A. Lerner; R. Gonen
- Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
A. Lerner; R. Gonen
- Incentive Compatible Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach
N. Buchbinder; R. Gonen
- Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities
A. Lerner; R. Gonen
- Increased Efficiency Through Pricing in Online Labor Markets
R. Gonen; D. Raban; C. Brady; M. Mazor
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
A. Lerner; R. Gonen
- The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings
R. Gonen; A. Lerner
- Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker
Y. Chen; S. Dimitrov; R. Sami; D. Reeves; D. Pennock; R. Hanson; L. Fortnow; R. Gonen
- Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
R. Gonen; E. Pavlov
- Sponsored Search Auctions With Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability
R. Gonen; S. Vassilvitskii
- An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget
R. Gonen; E. Pavlov
- Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
Y. Chen; D. M. Reeves; D. M. Pennock; R. D. Hanson; R. Gonen
- Characterizing Truthful Market Design
M. Gonen; R. Gonen; E. Pavlov
- An Incentive-Compatible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism
R. Gonen; E. Pavlov
- Generalized Trade Reduction Mechanisms
M. Gonen; R. Gonen; E. Pavlov
- Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation
I. Abraham; D. Dolev; R. Gonen; J. Halpern
- Incentive Compatible Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Y. Bartal; R. Gonen; N. Nisan
- Linear Programming Helps Solve Large Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
R. Gonen; D. Lehmann
- Optimal Solutions for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: Branch and Bound Heuristics
R. Gonen; D. Lehmann